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 “The danger posed by war to all of humanity - and to our planet - is at least matched by 
the climate crisis” (Osborne, 2007). As is evident by this quote from UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon, climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing the world today, an issue that 
requires a global solution. It is for this reason that a UN Conference on Climate Change (COP 
15) was held in Copenhagen, Denmark, from 7-18 December 2009, with the objective of 
producing a legally binding international climate change agreement (BBC News, 2007). 
However, despite the seriousness of the climate change problem, the conference was unable to 
accomplish this objective (BBC News, 2009).   
 The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which the theoretical perspective 
referred to as neo-liberal institutionalism (or simply liberal institutionalism), explains the failure 
of the Copenhagen Summit—as it is commonly known—to produce a binding international 
agreement. This paper argues that, within the neo-liberal institutionalist framework, it is quite 
possible to provide a compelling explanation regarding the failure of Copenhagen. This, it is 
argued, is due to the fact that two ‘situational dimensions’ identified by the proponents of this 
theoretical perspective, as ‘affecting the propensity of actors to cooperate’—the payoff structure 
and the length of the shadow of the future  (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 228)—provide useful 
tools for determining why cooperation broke down at the conference; and, thus, why a binding 
agreement was not produced. In order to support this thesis, this paper will use these dimensions 
to demonstrate that the reason cooperation failed at Copenhagen—and a binding agreement was 
not established—was because the payoff structure was that of a Prisoners’ Dilemma; and because 
the shadow of the future was short, making this Prisoners’ Dilemma game single-play in nature.  
 This paper is divided into two sections. Section I will first demonstrate how certain payoff 
structures reflect certain games. It will then discuss the reason why the Copenhagen Summit 
represents a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, and how this affected cooperation amongst the 192 states 
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at the conference. Section II will first consider the implications of both a short and long shadow 
of the future on the nature of a Prisoners’ Dilemma—whether it is single-play or iterated. It will 
then discuss the reason why the shadow of the future during Copenhagen was short in nature, and 
how this affected cooperation.  
Payoff Structures 
Payoffs and Games 
 The term payoff structure, as it is used here, refers to the benefits accruing to actors from 
an outcome of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to an outcome of mutual defection (DD), and the 
benefits of an outcome of unilateral defection (DC) relative to an outcome of unreciprocated 
cooperation (CD) (Van Evera, 1985: 80). The payoff structure defines the “game” in which actors 
“play”; that is, whether the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma, Harmony or Deadlock1, depends on 
the payoff structure. In a game of Harmony actors have mutual interests; that is, they all prefer a 
certain reality i.e. the existence of an open global market. Therefore, since an outcome of mutual 
cooperation (CC) is more conducive to the realisation of such interests, than is an outcome of 
mutual defection (DD), mutual cooperation produces more benefit for the actors than does mutual 
defection; thus, CC > DD. Also in a game of Harmony, actors prefer an outcome of 
unreciprocated cooperation (CD) to an outcome of unilateral defection (DC). Using the example 
of the open global market, if actors were adherents of pure liberal economic principles, they 
would prefer unrequited cooperation—maintaining the openness of one’s market despite the 
protectionism of others—to unilateral defection—unilateral protectionism despite openness of 
others. The reason being that pure liberal economic adherents believe that openness is best, no 
matter what; that is, that one gains more benefit from cooperating than from defecting, regardless 
of the actions of others. Therefore, in a game of Harmony the payoff structure is as follows: CC > 
CD > DC > DD (Oye, 1985: 6).  
 In a game of Deadlock there exists no mutual interests, actors do not all prefer the same 
reality. Once again using the example of the global market, in a game of Deadlock some actors 
will prefer a closed global market to an open one, and vice versa. Therefore, since mutual 
defection (DD) will lead to the realisation of a closed global market, this outcome will produce 
more benefit for those actors that prefer this reality than would mutual cooperation (CC). On the 
other hand, since mutual cooperation (CC) leads to an open market, this outcome will produce 
more benefit for those actors that prefer this reality than would mutual defection (DD). Unilateral 
defection (DC) and unreciprocated cooperation (CD) do not produce benefit for either of the 
actors since in order to realise their interests the outcome must be (DD), for those whose interest 
is the existence of a closed global market, and (CC), for those whose interest is the existence of 
an open global market (Oye, 1985: 6-7). As a result, the payoff structure of a game of Deadlock 
is CC > DD for some actors, and DD > CC for others.  
 Unlike a game of Harmony, a purely cooperative game, or a game of Deadlock, a purely 
conflictual one, a Prisoners’ Dilemma game is, what Thomas Schelling has referred to as, a 
“mixed-motive game” (1960: 89). In such games, players prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to 
mutual defection (DD), but also prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unreturned cooperation (CD) 
(Oye, 1985: 6). The Prisoners’ Dilemma is as follows: the Crown Attorney is questioning two 
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guilty partners in a crime separately. Both of them knows that if neither of them confesses the 
Crown will only have enough evidence to convict them for the low-level crime for which they 
were arrested, which means they will only go to prison for 30 days each; and if both confess they 
will each be given a prison sentence of one year. If this were the decision each prisoner faced, 
each would have the incentive not to confess. Except, the Crown has also promised each of them 
that if either confesses while the other does not, the confessor will walk free, and his partner will 
receive a five-year sentence. Expressed in game theoretic terms, the defective strategy for each 
prisoner is to confess, whereas the cooperative strategy is to “stonewall” or not confess. In such a 
situation, defection is the dominant strategy of each prisoner; dominant strategy being the course 
of action that is in each prisoner’s rational self-interest. If prisoner A cooperates then prisoner B 
will gain more benefit by defecting than he would by cooperating; by defecting he walks free, by 
cooperating he serves 30 days in prison. Moreover, if prisoner A defects then once again prisoner 
B will gain more benefit by defecting than he would by cooperating; by defecting he serves one 
year in prisoner, by cooperating he serves five years. However, since both prisoners are assumed 
to be rational and self-interested, each will follow his dominant strategy, leading to mutual 
defection (DD); both are worse off than they would have been if they had cooperated (Keohane, 
2005: 68-69). The payoff structure of a Prisoners’ Dilemma game is thus: DC > CC > DD > CD.  
 In a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, as in one of Harmony, there exist mutual interests; that is, 
all actors prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD).2 The difference between 
these two games, however, is that in a game of Harmony all actors also prefer unrequited 
cooperation (CD) to unilateral defection (DC), whereas in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game it is the 
opposite (Oye, 1985: 6-7). As a result, in a game of Harmony the actions of players automatically 
result in the attainment of mutual interests; in other words, simply by following their dominant 
strategy (cooperation), players produce an outcome of mutual cooperation (Keohane, 1988: 380). 
In a game of Prisoners’ Dilemma, on the other hand, by following their dominant strategy 
(defection), players do not produce a mutually cooperative (CC) outcome—and do not attain their 
mutual interests; rather, they produce a mutually defective (DD) outcome. This does not mean, 
though, that actors can never realise their mutual interests; doing so, however, requires 
cooperation. 
 “Cooperation”, here, is defined as it is by Robert O. Keohane (2005: 51) in his book-
length project, After Hegemony. Keohane defines cooperation as the bringing into conformity of 
the actions of separate actors through a process of negotiation, often referred to as ‘policy 
coordination’; that is, cooperation takes place when  ‘actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others’. The extent to which actors can cooperate is strongly affected 
by the length of the shadow of the future, which determines whether the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
game is iterated or single-play; iteration positively affects cooperation. This will be discussed in 
Section II. This section will now demonstrate why states at Copenhagen were involved in a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma game.  
Copenhagen: A Prisoners’ Dilemma? 
 According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, a global temperature rise of above two degrees centigrade could have ‘dangerous’ and 
‘irreversible’ consequences for the climate system; temperature increase being the result of the 
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emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere. The report predicts that if global 
average temperature surpasses this two degree threshold, there is likely to be: major changes in 
temperature patterns, with the extended warmer periods increasing water demand and evaporative 
losses, as well as the intensity and duration of droughts; an increase in precipitation at high 
latitudes and a decrease in some mid-latitude regions, increasing, together with a general 
intensification of rainfall events, the frequency of flash floods and large-area floods in many 
regions, especially at high latitudes; an intensification of tropical cyclones (including hurricanes 
and typhoons) as sea surface temperature increases, with models projecting increases by mid-
century; and more frequent and intense storm surges, with damages being exacerbated by more 
intense inland rainfall and stronger winds (Schneider et al., 2007).  
 These are just a few of the projected consequences of continuing to emit GHGs into the 
atmosphere, leading to a global temperature increase of over two degrees centigrade. It is, 
nevertheless, evident that such climatic changes will have serious and detrimental effects on the 
planet, and on humans in particular. Therefore, it is in the interest of all humans—and therefore 
all states—that such climatic changes not occur; that is, there exists a mutual interest amongst all 
actors (states, in this case): the absence of serious climate change. In order to realise this mutual 
interest, however, all actors must reduce their GHG emissions or, in the context of the 
Copenhagen Summit, all actors must agree to a binding international agreement on reducing 
emissions. Thus, in game-theoretic terms, the cooperative strategy at Copenhagen was agreeing 
to a binding agreement and the defective strategy was not agreeing, with mutual cooperation 
(CC) resulting in the attainment of the mutual interest and mutual defection (DD) not resulting in 
its attainment. Thus, for each state at the conference CC > DD, meaning the Copenhagen Summit 
was either a game of Harmony or Prisoners’ Dilemma; not Deadlock, since climate change was 
not, and is not, in any actor’s interest.  
 In a globalised world, the ease by which large corporations can move from one region, 
where the cost of operation is high, to another region, where the cost is lower, is quite impressive. 
This means that a country that has environmental regulations, which increases the cost of 
operation for most large companies, will look less attractive to these corporations than would a 
country without environmental regulations, and thus, without the added cost of operation. As a 
result, such large corporations tend to move their operations from those countries with 
environmental regulations, to those without such regulations, reducing the number of jobs and 
revenue in the former, and increasing it in the latter. The loss of a significant number of such 
corporations could destroy an economy. It is for this reason that countries are concerned with 
competitiveness (Black, 2010)—their attractiveness to capital—and why, at the Copenhagen 
Summit the dominant strategy for states was defection and not cooperation; that is, defection was 
the rational, self-interested course of action. If state A cooperated, state B would be better off 
defecting—gaining capital investment—and If state A defected, state B would once again be 
better off defecting—avoiding a CD outcome, where state A gained capital investment and state 
B suffered capital flight. The Copenhagen Summit was, therefore, a Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
Although each state preferred mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD), the dominant 
strategy for each state was defection and not cooperation. This meant that by following their 
dominant strategy—their individual rational course of action—states produced a mutually 
defective (DD) outcome, leaving all worse off than if they had cooperated.  
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 The Prisoners’ Dilemma game described in this section has been one of a single-play 
nature; however, Prisoners’ Dilemma can also be iterated. Whether a game is single play or 
iterated depends on the length of the shadow of the future. This will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
The Shadow of the Future 
The Shadow of the Future and Single-Play or Iteration 
 As just mentioned, the length of the shadow of the future determines the nature of a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma game—whether it is a single-play or an iterated game; the shadow of the 
future being the degree to which future payoffs (gains) are valued relative to current ones, or the 
degree to which future payoffs are ‘discounted’ (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 232). A long 
shadow of the future—small discount rate—generates an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game, and 
a short shadow of the future—large discount rate—creates a single play game. Under single-play 
conditions, actors value the short-term more than the long term; they are, thus, continuously 
tempted by immediate gains from unilateral defection (DC), and weary about immediate losses 
from unreciprocated cooperation (CD). In contrast, under iterated conditions actors are less 
tempted by immediate gains from unilateral defection (DC), and less fearful of immediate losses 
from unrequited cooperation (CD); they value the long-term more than they value the short-term. 
Therefore, under single-play conditions defection is the dominant strategy for actors, while under 
iterated conditions the dominant strategy is cooperation (Oye, 1985: 12-14). As a result, 
cooperation is more likely under iterated, rather than single-play, conditions. Therefore, the short 
nature of the Copenhagen shadow of the future could be important in explaining why cooperation 
failed and, therefore, why a binding agreement was not produced. This section will now 
demonstrate why the length of the shadow of the future was short, and in so doing will provide 
another reason, in addition to the payoff structure, for the failure of the Copenhagen Summit. 
Copenhagen: A Single-Play Game? 
 This section identifies a major reason why the shadow of the future during the UN 
Conference on Climate Change was short in nature, this reason being the existence of a widely 
held belief that a quick and inexpensive technological innovation will solve the problem of 
climate change, and allow for the continuation of business as usual. Although, there are perhaps 
many sources of this belief, this section identifies two possibilities: “geo-engineering” and 
“carbon capture and storage”. Geo-engineering is the use of various, relatively inexpensive, 
‘quick-fix’ techniques to cool the Earth’s temperature and, thus, potentially slow down climate 
change. These techniques include the positioning of millions of tiny mirrors in space for the 
purpose of reflecting back some of the sun's rays; the spraying of sea water into the atmosphere 
in order to make it cloudier—thus, filtering the Sun’s energy; the extraction of CO2 from the 
atmosphere and oceans; the painting of roofs white; and, a slightly more expensive technique, the 
use of rockets to launch tonnes of sulphur into the stratosphere, creating a planetary sun screen 
(Bowlby, 2008).   
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 Carbon capture and storage, on the other hand, is a method of capturing carbon dioxide (a 
major GHG) and storing it, potentially reducing emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere; thereby 
stopping or, at least, slowing down climate change. It is a three step process: capturing carbon 
emissions from power stations and other industrial sources; transporting the captured CO2, by 
pipelines, to storage areas; and storing the CO2 in geological sites such as depleted oil and gas 
fields (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010). 
 The belief that the climate crisis will be solved by a quick and inexpensive technological 
innovation, that will allow for the continuation of business as usual, shortened the Copenhagen 
shadow of the future. Since states believed that the problem would soon be solved, they highly 
discounted the future—they valued the short-term more than the long-term. And as previously 
mentioned in this section, when the shadow of the future is short, a Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
becomes single-play, rather than iterated, in nature; causing the players of the game to constantly 
be tempted by immediate gains from unilateral defection (DC), and weary of immediate losses 
from unrequited cooperation (CD). The dominant strategy, as a result, becomes defection, 
making the likelihood of cooperation very slim. Therefore, the short shadow of the future 
provides another reason, in addition to the payoff structure, for the failure of the Copenhagen 
Summit to produce a binding international climate change agreement.  
Conclusion 
 Despite the seriousness of the climate change problem, the 2009 UN Conference on 
Climate change, responsible for producing a binding international agreement reducing global 
emissions of GHGs, failed to achieve its objective due to the breakdown of cooperation amongst 
the 192 states involved. The purpose of this paper was to determine the extent to which the neo-
liberal institutionalist perspective explains the breakdown of cooperation at, and thus the failure 
of, the Copenhagen Summit. This paper argued that it is very possible, through the neo-liberal 
institutionalist framework, to provide a valid explanation for why cooperation failed at 
Copenhagen, and thus why a binding international agreement was not produced. In order to 
support this thesis, this paper used two ‘situational dimensions’, identified by the proponents of 
neo-liberal institutionalism as having an effect on the propensity of actors to cooperation—the 
payoff structure and the length of the shadow of the future—to determine why cooperation failed 
at the conference; and therefore, why a treaty was not produced. In so doing, this paper 
demonstrated that the reason Copenhagen failed was because the payoff structure was that of a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, and because the shadow of the future was short, making the existent 
Prisoners’ Dilemma single-play in nature; a single-play game being the least cooperative type of 
Prisoners’ Dilemma.  
 The findings of this paper are important in that they show, despite the difficulty of doing 
so, cooperating is not impossible. By extending the shadow of the future, through the realisation 
of the non-existence of a quick-fix technology, or by restructuring payoffs to produce a game of 
Harmony, through the restriction of capital mobility, cooperation can occur. Therefore, even 
though cooperation is difficult, it is not impossible; the states of the world can cooperate to 
combat climate change.  
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 These findings are not, however, limited in scope to global cooperation on climate 
change. The same dimensions—payoff structure and length of the shadow of the future—could 
also be used in determining the failure or success of cooperation in areas such as nuclear 
proliferation, global finance, trade, peacekeeping and so on. The applicability of the findings of 
this paper is, therefore, quite broad.  
 In addition to the ‘situational dimensions’ of payoff structure and length of the shadow of 
the future, neo-liberal institutionalists also identify the number of players as having an effect on 
cooperation. This paper did not include this dimension, however, due to the limited size of the 
project and the resultant inability to deal with the complexities involved with its incorporation. 
Therefore, in a larger, more comprehensive project this dimension should also be included in 
order to obtain a more complete picture.   
 The findings of this paper have demonstrated that, despite the fact that states interact with 
one another within an anarchic international system, cooperation amongst them is not impossible; 
it is however very difficult, and dependent upon a number of factors. 
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